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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
,\HTIE i\HSSIE BANKS,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

'}

r
;

1;s.

HOY SHIVERS,

~

Case No. 10854

Defendant and Respondent)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Tlm; is an action for compensatory and punitive
damages by Appellant for an alleged assault and battery
r:ommittecl upon Appellant by Respondent. Respondent
tiled herein a Counterclaim for damages alleging assault
and battery by Appellant upon Respondent.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'11 he case was tried to the Court sitting with a jury.

'l'he Court submitted the issue to the jury for a general
verdict, and the jury returned a verdict of no cause of
action against Appellant on her Complaint and no cause
of action for Respondent on his Counterclaim. The Appellant tirndy moved the Court for a new trial, which
motion the Trial Court denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the J·ud
.

the .1ury and the Trial Court's order denyi

,

.

ant s ::\lotion for a New Trial.

gJnent !Ji

~

:

A

M

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of the facts is

incomplete ,
and in part incorrect. It is axiomatic that, in view o!
the jury's finding against A ppe11ant, this Court iiill
view the evidence in light most favorable to such find
ings. Accordingly, the Court's attention is invited to fo,
facts from the record in the following particulars.
1'he evening of April 19, 1967, Respondent, in com.
pan.v with one Henry King, came to the apartment of
Appellant and one Mary Graham for the purpose ot
having Miss Graham cook some chicken for them. (Tr

1

43 and 44) When Messrs. Shivers and King arrived,
they were invited into the apartment of Miss Graham
and 1\fiss Banks. (Tr. 14 lns 11-15) Only the four per- ,
sons named were present at this time, and they were
later joined by one Lou Ann Martinez. (Tr. 15 ln 22)
The room where the incident in question occurred
has a kitchen in one end divided from the rest of the
room by a divider approximately three feet high. (Ex.
P-1 and Tr. 32, Ins 17-22) After exchanging greetings,
King and Graham went to the kitchen area to begin
preparing the chicken; and Appellant and Respondent.

3
rrrnaiM(l in the living and dining area. (Tr. 15) When
~!artinez entered the apartment, she went to the kitchen

;i]'(·a. (Tr. 29, lns lG-30)

lnitially, Hespondent had been seated on the couch
m

tlw liYing area studying. He stood up and walked to

tl 11,

~aid

di,·ider and began playing with a stack of cards

'litre. He asked who they belonged to, and Appellant

rl'plie(l the~- ,,-ere hers and directed Respondent to put
rllem down, which he did. (Tr. 30, Ins 13-30) Appellant
tl1en·npon got up from her seat at the table (See Ex.
i'-1 ), rPmoved the cards from the room, and returned.
.\ conversation then ensued which triggered
1 Tr. 31)
tl1e pvents giving ri3e to Appellant's claim, the suband demeanor of which the record reveals some
cnnflirt concerning.
~':ance

Appellant, in her Brief, pages 3 and 4, cites her
own testimony that Respondent said to her, "I ought
to knnek you up side of your nappy head," (Tr. 16, Ins
2-± & 2fi) whereupon Respondent moved toward Appellant in a rapid manner and clapped his hands near her

face. ('fr. 17) Omitted from Appellant's Statement of
the Facts was the testimony of Mr. King on cross-examination lff Mr. Yan Seiver when he testified as follows:

Q. .\nd what did he sayr
A

And he say. ''What if I don't,'' like that.

Q.

Did he say, "What if I hit

you~"

4

A.

Yeah, he said, "What if I hit you'" l'k

Q.

Did he say this in a loud manner~

A.

No. He was smiling while he was sayin

Q.

Now "What if I hit you?"

A.

Yes.

·

1

e that.
.

g 11l11,

Q. All right, no,v, was Miss Banks facing \h~ '
table at this time 1

A.

Yes, she was facing this way, yes.

Q. She didn't see the manner in which Mr. Shiv.
ers tendered this statement; is that correct:

A.

She was watching him while he said it.

Q. Well, now, can you describe the smile that
was on his face?
A. Well, like he smiles all the time. You know.
Just like one does. That's the way he talks.

Q.

Was it said in a manner-

A.

It was in a playful manner. That's what it

was. In a playful manner.
Q.

But the comment wasn't playful. He said.

''What if I hit you?''
A. Well, that was a playful manner.
(gmphasis Added) (Tr. 57 lns. 4-26)
Also omitted from Appellant's Statement of the

5
fad:s was Appellant's statement m her deposition,

"-Jwn, under questioning by Mr. Hoggan, she testified
n~

follows :

Okay. Let me just go back over this with you
for a minute. Now when he said: "I ought to hit
mu beside your nappy head," did that generate
!'ear in you'!
(~.

A.

l fear no one.

Q.

I see

Because I feel that all anyone can do is kill
me, and if it's in.stant it doesn't bother me at all.
A.

Q.

So ~-ou weren't afraid by what he said T

,\.

I'.'o, I wasn't afraid.

(1£rnphasis added) (Desposition of Appellant, page 18,
linrs l 0-18)

After Respondent had clapped his hands, he then
moved away from Appellant toward the door; where-

upon. Appellant jumped up and ran toward Respondent.
Respondent turned to face Appellant. (Tr. 58, Ins 3-16)
Appellant, at page 4 of her Brief, states that Respondent
then leaned ltis chest against Appellant. Appellant so
testified. (Tr. 18, Ins 15-17) However, Mr. King testified
that ''as soon as he (Respondent) turned around, she
I Appellant) ·was there with her chest all up in his face
.... " (Tr. 58, Ins 20 and 21; see also Tr. 47, Ins 15-19;
and Tr. 58 and 59)
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Appellant then began hitting Respondent ·

m

t~,

stomach and face. (Tr. 47 and 48; Tr. 18, ln 20· 'l'

, r.

Tr. 73, lns 25-30; and Tr. 74, lns 1-3) Respondent

PU~

.

\·

led

Appellant away, and she fell backward onto the floi)J

(Tr. 33, lns 26-30; Tr. 48, lns 10-26) Appellant contend,
in her f'tatement of facts that Respondent came towafr
Appellant as she was on the floor. (Brief p. 4) However
both .i\Iartinez and King testified that Shivers w~,
heading toward the couch where his hat was; and whµn
he came near Appellant, she kicked him. Responden;
then turned to face Appellant, and she kicked him in '
the groin (Tr. 48 and 49; Tr. 35, lns 18-30; and Tr. 361
Respondent then held Appellant's hands and struck
her once with an open hand to restrain her. (Tr. 35, ln~
7-10 and Tr. 49, lns 9 and 10) At this point, Mr.King
restrained Respondent and Appellant got up. Respondent
sensed blood coming from his mouth and, in the heat
of the sequence of events, reached out and took Appellant
by the neck, pushing her against the wall. (Tr. 49, 50, '
and 51) Again, Mr. King restrained Respondent; and
King, Martinez, and Respondent left the apartment.
On this state of the record, the jury returned averdict against Appellant on her Complaint, no cause ot
action. Appellant moved for a new trial, which motion
was denied and hense, this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THF~ COl~RT

IN ITS INSTRUCTION TO THE

.ffRY CORRECTLY DEFINED AN ASSAULT AND,
[~

ANY EYENT, AND UNDER ANY DEFINITION

OF ASSArLT, THE JURY CORRECTLY FOUND NO
_\SSAI'LT HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT rPON APPELLANT.
'l1he Court instructed the Jury on assault as follows:
"An assault is an unlawful attempt coupled with
a present ability to commit an injury on the person of another.''
Appellant excepted to this instruction (Tr. 89) and
cites to this Court in support of her contention that the
Honorable Trial Court's definition was erroneous, the
Restatement of Torts and Prosser. While both are eminent authorities, neither could be considered paramount
to the authority of the Utah Supreme Court which, in
the ease of Ganaway v. Salt Lake Dramatic Association,
17 l't. 37, 53 P. 830, held the only thing wrong with the
following definition of assault:
·'An assault is an attempt, coupled with an ability, to commit a violent injury upon the person of
another." (emphasis added)
was

inclusion of the word "violent."

It will be observed that if the word "violent" is
omitted from the definition in the Ganaway case, it be-

8
comes practically word for word the same as the lY,
Court's definition in the instant case. The Trial Couri,~:
1
definition of assault comports with the defi'n·t· ·
1 ion 01
assault given by this Court.
·
Nor is this Court alone in so defining an assault. In
the relatively recent case of Cook v. Kinzua Pine )jj]l,
Co., 207 Ore. 34, 293 P2d 717, the Oregon Supreme Court
defined a civil assault as:
'' ... an ~t~empt with force or violence to dG
corporal mJury to another from malice or wan.
tonness or is an intentional attempt to do vinlenr,
Io anotl1er's person coupled with present abil 1t1,
to carry intention into effect.'' (emphasis added)
But, assuming, without admitting, for the purpo~e
of argument, that the Restatement of Torts definition
quoted from Section 21, Subsection 1 at page 7 of Ap.
pellant 's Brief is the law, the result of the case would
have been the same for the reasons:
First, that the act of Respondent did not put Ap·
pellant '' . . . in apprehension of immediate and harm·
ful or offensive contact . . . '' In her deposition, Appel·
lant stated that Respondent's words did not make her
afraid. (Appellant's deposition, page 18)
Second, that the apprehension mentioned in the
Restatement is apprehension that would be caused in the
mind of a reasonable person. (Prosser on Torts, 2nd
Edition, page 35) Mr. King testified when being cross·
examined hy Appellant's Attorney that Respondent and

1

9

Appellant were facing each other when Respondent
.-aid he would hit her and clapped hi.s hands in front of

h.;i· face and that Respondent was smiling and acting
a playful manner. (Tr. 57) Such action, under any
circumstances, would not create apprehension in the
utind of a reasonable person.
in

'l'hird. that '' . . . apprehension is not justified
where they (words) indicate that the defendant is offering a hlow in jest . . . " (Prosser on Torts, 2nd Edition,
page 36) The testimony of Mr. King cited above gives
evidence from which a jury could conclude that the
wordR and gestures of Respondent were in jest.
Fourth. that Respondent did not intend to ''
inflict a harmful or offensive contact . . . '' on Appellant (Restatement of Torts, Sec. 21, Subsection 1) After
clapping his hands, Respondent walked away from Appellant. ('l'r. 57, Ins 26-30) The record is void of any
showing of belligerence on Respondent's part to this
point. Respondent testified he didn't intend to touch
Appellant when he clapped his hands and that had he
so intended he would have touched her. (Tr. 78, Ins 16-30)
As to the other action triggered by the hand clap,
it is Respondent's contention that if anyone was assaulted, it was Respondent. The sequence of events outlined
in detail in Respondent's statement of facts shows that
Appellant first pushed her chest against Respondent and
then struck Respondent in the stomach and mouth; that

10
m self defense, Respondent pushed A1)pellant t ,
floor; that Appellant then kicked Respondent

0 i),,

r

m tl11'
side and in the groin; that in response to th 1'~~ act'ion a ,,
1
provocation, Respondent hit Appellant once with un

open hand and grabbed her by the throat and p ,1

,

u~ 1~1 1

her against the wall. No where in this sequence of ewm.
is there a fact which would alter the jury's defiio!i
against Appellant under any definition of a civil a8sau\:
POINT II
THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELL ,
ANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AS THE .JrJt'i
ON DISPUTED EVIDENCE RESOLVED THE
FACTS AGAINST APPELLANT ON HER cm1.
PLAINT, AND THE JURY'S FINDINGS WERE
B01'TOMED ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
Appellant contends that: (1) Respondent used excessive force against Appellant in repulsing an attack
on him; (2) Respondent eannot justify his action on thr
ground of self defense; and ( 3) Respondent had a dun
to withdraw. (Appellant's Brief, pages 10 and 11)
·with reference to the first contention, the Court in
instruction number three to the jury stated:
"One who is assaulted, with or without provocation, may use reasonable force to repel thP
attack without being liable for an assa~lt a~d
batterv. But one may not use excessive force 1~
repelling the attack, but only that amount ot
force which ma:' reasonably appear to the (sicl

1

11

per:-;on attacked to be necessary to repel his adyersary at the time . . . " (R. 33)
Appellant did not except to this instruction (Tr. 89
and 90) and under rules needing no citation of authority

,rJien tlw jury found under this instruction against Apon <lisputed evidence, its finding will not be disnellant
,.
turbed unless unfounded on competent evidence. In this
('a~e. the evidence of the degree of force used by Appellnnt \\as <lisrmted and eertainly there was competent
1,ndenee upon ·which the jury bottomed its findings and
decision that, in effect, no excessive force had been
1 t~f·d by Appellant. The jury's finding need not and
~hould not he disturbed.
Contentions (2) and (3) will be considered together.
The first time Appellant told Respondent to leave
was when Respondent clapped his hands and walked
away from her. She immediately jumped up and shouted
"Get out of here." (See testimony of Martinez, Tr. 31,
Ins 22-30) When Respondent turned around, Appellant
was .iumping against him and immediately began hitting
him Assuming for argument, without admitting, that
Respondent had a duty to retreat, Respondent had no
chance to retreat but was given only two alternatives:
stand and take it or defend himself. He chose the latter
and, after repelling Appellant's attack, started to get
his hat. (Tr. 48, Ins 16-26 and Tr. 49, lns 5-10)
At this point, Appellant again kicked him on the

12
side and in the grom. (Tr. 36, lns 3-12 and Tr . .f!), \;J,
5-10)

One is led to the question, ""What could a 1,ecison.
,
able person have done under the circumstance~ t]::i,
Respondent didn't do~" and to conclude with the .iu :·
that Respondent acted in self defense as his only rr:al
istic alternative inasmuch as the swift and continuou,
attack of Appellant made retreat under the ciremmtan
ees impossible.
Finally, it should be observed that Lou Ann ~lar
inez, who was Appellant's witness, gives a most re.
vealing and frank account of the incident. One cam:-:1:
read her entire testimony without being left with tnc
feeling and led to the conclusion that the jury correcTI:
decided the facts of this case against Plaintiff on hPr
Complaint.
CONCLUSION
The jury was properly instructed and on conflicting
but competent evidence found against Appellant on her
Complaint. The Trial Court correctly overruled Appellant's Motion for a New Trial The decision of the jury
and the Trial Court should be affirmed by this Court
Respectfully submitted.
OLSON & HOGGAN
L. Brent Hoggan
Attorney for Respondent

